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The nation’s chemical infrastructure is at risk
of terrorist attack (U.S. Department of
Justice 2000). The vulnerabilities of chemi-
cal-related industries, although recognized
before 11 September 2001, became dramati-
cally more pressing that day after terrorists
demonstrated the capacity for catastrophic
strikes against key U.S. targets. In 2003, the
Homeland Security Advisory System issued
alerts that identified the U.S. nuclear and
chemical manufacturing infrastructure as
potential terrorist targets (National Infra-
structure Protection Center 2003a, 2003b).
That same year, the General Accounting
Ofﬁce [now the Government Accountability
Ofﬁce (GAO)] identiﬁed chemical facilities as
potentially attractive targets threatening
nearby population centers (GAO 2003a). The
GAO linked these potential vulnerabilities to
more than 15,000 sites across the United
States identified by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) as Risk Management
Program (RMP) sites with large volumes of
highly hazardous chemicals.
The GAO (2003a) showed that 123
chemical facilities have worst-case scenarios
involving more than a million people in the
surrounding area at risk of exposure to a cloud
of toxic gas if a release occurred. Estimates
show that 700 sites could put 100,000 people
at risk, and approximately 3,000 sites could
put 10,000 people at risk.
RMP worst-case estimates, although valu-
able, have limitations for assessing the possible
consequences of attacks on chemical facilities.
First, releases caused by intentional acts may
differ in size, scope, and severity from acciden-
tal releases from a single vessel or process line
(Belke 2000; GAO 2003a). Second, RMP
consequence analyses involve off-site commu-
nities rather than on-site populations. Third,
people estimated to be directly affected by a
toxic release would be limited to those in the
path of the toxic plume, not necessarily the
entire population within a theoretical zone of
vulnerability.
Although threats to the nation’s chemical
infrastructure loom large, limited data are
available to gauge progress in prevention, pre-
paredness, or response (Falkenrath 2005).
This mirrors the lack of useful data to assess
industry progress in the prevention of serious
chemical accidents (Hood 2004; Mary Kay
O’Connor Process Safety Center 2002a; Poje
2005).
Facilities with large volumes of highly haz-
ardous chemicals employ multiple layers of
protection for potential chemical releases,
fires, and explosions. These layers include
security measures to control and limit access,
containment and other mitigation systems,
automatic warnings and alarms, and emer-
gency response. In general, a hierarchy that
places primary emphasis on design and engi-
neering solutions governs the potential effec-
tiveness of each layer of protection (Reason
1999, 2000; Renner 2004).
Since September 11, there have been
repeated demonstrations of the potential for
terrorists to skirt security and gain access to
chemical facilities (CBS News 2003; Prine
2002, 2003). Accordingly, some policy propo-
nents seek to expand the focus from perimeter
security to more effective layers of protection
that would first make chemical facilities less
vulnerable targets and then, if attacked, limit
the consequences (Corzine 2005).
A major strategy for this expanded focus is
the concept of “inherently safer” technologies
[Kahn and Amyotte 2003; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) 2003a]. These technologies aim to
eliminate or minimize the potential for cata-
strophic events by designing hazards out of
process systems (Kletz 1996). Inherently safer
design strategies include a) substituting highly
hazardous substances with less hazardous ones;
b) minimizing levels of hazardous materials
and energy; c) moderating hazards with the
use of alternative forms of materials; and
d) reducing unnecessary systems complexity to
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Commentaryincrease process controllability (Crowl 1996).
Such improvements would limit not only the
desirability of sites as terrorist targets but also
the consequences of such an attack. Further,
inherently safer improvements would reduce
overall day-to-day risks of an unintentional
incident affecting the plant, the community,
and the environment.
Despite the consensus about chemical site
vulnerability, there is evidence from the U.S.
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB) that government, companies,
workers, responders, and the public are not
adequately prepared for unintentional inci-
dents (Merritt 2005). These ﬁndings from the
CSB provide valuable insight into possible
intentional incidents. An independent task
force sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations concluded that the nation’s emer-
gency responders were “drastically under-
funded and dangerously unprepared” for
another major terrorist attack, especially “one
involving chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear agents” (Rudman et al. 2003, p. 7).
The GAO (2003b) found similar deﬁciencies
in hospital preparedness.
These deficiencies are in contrast to the
comprehensive needs in the areas of preven-
tion, preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation enunciated for government and the
private sector in the National Incident
Management System [U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) 2004b] and the
related National Response Plan (DHS 2004a).
Most recently, the GAO (2006) reported that
a) the chemical industry still “faces challenges in
preparing against terrorism” (p. 5); b) despite its
voluntary programs, “the extent to which indi-
vidual companies across the industry are
addressing security issues is unclear” (p. 57);
c) “DHS cannot ensure that all high-risk facili-
ties are assessing their vulnerability to terrorist
attacks and taking corrective actions, where
necessary” (p. 6); and d) DHS has concluded
that “its existing authorities do not permit it
to effectively regulate the industry, and that
the Congress should enact federal require-
ments for chemical facilities” (pp. 6–7).
At the community level, findings from a
survey of households within a 1-mi radius of
sites with large volumes of highly hazardous
chemicals (i.e., RMP sites) also showed a lack
of preparedness (Mary Kay O’Connor Process
Safety Center 2002b). Among households
defined as living near chemical facilities that
are considered at high risk for a release, only
one-fourth were aware of the facilities posing
the risk. Similarly, less than one-third of this
high-risk group believed that community
members were informed (very well or ade-
quately) about where to get information in a
chemical emergency.
The DHS’s Interim National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (DHS 2005) recognizes the
importance of participation of all stakeholders.
Similarly, a review of 239 published case studies
in environmental decision making concludes
that involved stakeholders contribute new ideas
and analysis and improve decisions (Beierle
2002). Following the guidance of the U.S.
Clean Air Act (U.S. EPA 1990), the New Jersey
Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (State of
New Jersey 2005) has also validated the impor-
tance of worker involvement in chemical plant
safety by recognizing the right of employees and
their representatives to participate in facility
inspections and investigations.
Legislative and regulatory approaches. To
address these many documented risks and
deficiencies, in April 2005 the U.S. Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (2005) began a series of
hearings on the security of the U.S. chemical
industry. During these hearings, Stephenson
(2005) of the GAO stated that both the federal
government and the chemical industry have
taken some necessary steps but that the nation
needs to take further action. Stephan (2005),
representing the DHS, provided similar testi-
mony before this same Senate committee, con-
cluding that the current “patchwork” of
authority does not form the basis for effective
regulation. In response to a 2003 report (GAO
2003a), the DHS noted that voluntary efforts
were inadequate to address possible threats and
that all RMP sites “should be required to per-
form comprehensive vulnerability assessments
and take actions to reduce vulnerabilities”
(Stephenson 2005, p. 5).
Participatory Research Study
In an effort to determine whether disaster pre-
vention and preparedness had improved since
September 11, a research team—originally
from the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical
and Energy Workers International Union
(PACE) and now, postmerger, part of the
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber,
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and
Service Workers International Union (USW)—
conducted a national study of RMP sites
(PACE 2004) using a participatory research
approach (Israel et al. 1994; McQuiston
2000). The participatory research team
included USW rank and ﬁle workers and staff
as well as education and evaluation consultants
(PACE 2004). The team designed the survey
instrument to assess union leaders’ perceptions
of activities since September 11, including
company actions to improve prevention and
emergency response and their effectiveness,
and the involvement in these issues by the local
union, hourly workers, and the community.
Surveys were mailed between March and June
2004 to union leaders at 189 sites that, at the
time of the study, were PACE-represented
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Table 1. Company actions to prevent and prepare to respond to a catastrophic event.
Was action taken? Yes (%) No (%) Don’t know (%)
Prevention
1. Improved systems to guard and secure the planta,b 72.8 23.2 4.0
2. Assessed vulnerabilitiesc,d 66.4 12.0 21.6
3. Reassessed worksite securitya,b 64.0 19.2 16.8
4. Updated warning systemsb,c 38.4 48.8 12.8
5. Improved training and procedures to prevent possible terrorist attacksb,c 37.6 54.4 8.0
6. Improved containment of potential hazardsb,c 33.6 50.4 16.0
7. Reduced volumes of hazardous substancesb,c 16.8 60.0 23.2
8. Strengthened plant vessels, tanks, piping, or other structuresb,c 16.8 65.6 17.6
9. Improved the siting of hazardous substances or processes to less  13.6 68.8 17.6
vulnerable locationsb,c
Preparation to respond
10. Provided emergency response training to employees within the past  67.5 26.0 6.5
12 monthse,f
11. Conducted emergency response drills for the plant sitee,g 58.9 35.5 5.6
12. Updated emergency response plan for the facilitye,g 46.8 33.1 20.2
13. Informed local ﬁre and police departments, HazMat teams, etc., about  45.5 14.6 39.8
potential plant-speciﬁc hazardse,f
14. Put in place additional procedures to inform employees of an emergency  41.9 50.8 7.3
(e.g., alarms, public address system)e,g
15. Improved quality and availability of personal protective equipmentc,g 30.4 57.6 12.0
16. Updated shutdown procedures for critical equipment in an emergencye,g 29.8 41.1 29.0
17. Informed local hospitals, health departments, emergency medical personnel,
etc., about the potential health threats from plant-speciﬁc exposurese,g 23.4 20.2 56.5
18. Updated emergency response plan for the communitye,g 21.0 33.9 45.2
19. Put in place additional procedures to inform the community about an  15.3 45.2 39.5
emergency (e.g., alarms, public address system)e,g
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. All data are from PACE (2004). 
aResponses to survey question 5 (items 1 and 3): Since September 11, has the company at your worksite done any of the
following related to plant security in the face of new terrorist threats? bItems 1 and 3–9, n = 125, 0.0% missing. cResponses
to survey question 4 (items 2, 4–9, and 15): Since September 11, has the company at your worksite taken any of the follow-
ing actions to prevent a catastrophic event caused by a terrorist attack? dItem 2, n = 124, 0.8% missing. eResponses to
survey question 7 (items 10–14,16–19): Since September 11, has the company at your worksite taken any of the following
actions to be better prepared to respond to a catastrophic event that was caused by a possible terrorist attack? fItems 10
and 13, n = 123, 1.6% missing. gItems 11–12 and 14–19, n = 124, 0.8% missing.(now USW-represented) RMP sites. The
response rate was 70% and included 133 sites
in 37 states (PACE 2004).
Findings of the study (PACE 2004) were
limited to the 95% of sites (n = 125) deter-
mined to be at greatest risk based on each
respondents’ assessment that the site had
quantities of hazardous materials large enough
to cause a catastrophic event on-site if those
materials were involved in a ﬁre, explosion, or
other release. Notably, 80% of these sites
(n = 100) also reported quantities of hazardous
materials large enough to cause a catastrophic
event in the areas surrounding the plant.
Data Highlights 
Respondent site profile. The analysis (PACE
2004) included responses from union leaders
at 40 chemical plants (32% of sites), 32 pri-
mary paper mills (26%), 30 oil refineries
(24%), and 23 other types of industries
(18%). Regarding the size of the workforces at
these sites, 14 (11%) had ≥ 1,000 employees,
31 (25%) had 500–999 employees, 55 (44%)
had 100–499 employees, and 25 (20%) had
< 100 employees.
Company actions. In the PACE study
(PACE 2004), respondents were asked about a
variety of possible company actions taken since
September 11 aimed at preventing a cata-
strophic event caused by a terrorist attack. By
far, the most frequently reported preventative
improvements were systems to guard the plant
(73%), assessment of site vulnerabilities (66%),
and reassessment of worksite security (64%)
(Table 1). In contrast, the reduction of vol-
umes of hazardous substances—a step to make
sites inherently safer—was one of the least fre-
quently reported actions (17%), along with
design and engineering changes to strengthen
chemical containment (17%) and to improve
the siting of chemicals to less vulnerable areas
(14%). Thus, companies reportedly tended to
take fewer steps that are more effective in
addressing fundamental vulnerabilities key to
preventing an event.
The survey also queried respondents about
company actions to prepare them to respond to
a terrorist incident (PACE 2004). Respondents
most frequently reported that companies pro-
vided employee emergency response training
(68%) and conducted emergency response
drills (59%) (Table 1). According to respon-
dents, less than one-third of companies had
updated emergency shutdown procedures for
equipment (30%), informed hospitals and
others about potential health threats from
plant-speciﬁc exposures (23%), updated their
emergency response plan for the community
(21%), or added procedures to inform the
community about an emergency (15%). Thus,
the reportedly least frequently taken actions
were those that might also help both on-site
workers and surrounding communities better
address an event perpetrated at the site.
In addition, respondents provided detail
about the company training noted above.
Overall, it was reportedly rare that companies
trained a majority of their workforces in
these issues. Fifteen percent or fewer of the
respondents reported the provision of pre-
vention and response preparedness training
to greater than one-half of their site’s work-
force since September 11 (PACE 2004). A
sizable proportion of respondents reported
no employee training in preventing (34%) or
responding to (28%) an event. Moreover,
74% of respondents reported that union
employees at these sites needed additional
training of this type.
Effectiveness of company actions. Only
18% of respondents reported that their com-
panies’ prevention actions had been more than
“slightly effective” in lessening their plant’s
vulnerability to terrorist attack (Figure 1). The
study found similar results for the effectiveness
of companies’ actions to prepare their work-
sites to respond to a potentially catastrophic
event.
Collaboration among key parties.
Respondents also reported that it was rare that
companies worked with the local union,
hourly workers, or the community regarding
related prevention or response planning or
action (PACE 2004). Twenty-eight percent or
fewer respondents reported some type of
involvement of the local union, hourly work-
ers, or the community. Typically, the reported
involvement included the company informing
these groups rather than engaging them in
assessing the situation or making recommen-
dations. Almost two-thirds of respondents
reported that they were unaware of whether
the company worked with the community in
these ways.
Study Limitations
The study’s findings (PACE 2004) provide
respondent perceptions rather than indepen-
dent assessments of employer actions.
Respondents also frequently selected “don’t
know” for items related to company actions.
To our knowledge, The PACE survey (PACE
2004) is the ﬁrst survey conducted among local
union leaders on this topic. Therefore, there is
no basis for knowing if this is typical. However,
the “don’t know” responses (Table 1) do pro-
vide important data about the level of hourly
worker and local union leader involvement in
these issues.
In addition, security measures have limited
the public’s access to the RMP data used in site
selection, making it possible that some PACE-
represented sites included were not RMP sites
and vice versa. Further, the design of this study
precludes generalizability to all former PACE-
or current USW-represented workplaces or
industrial sectors or to other RMP sites.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
The PACE study (PACE 2004) shows that pri-
marily voluntary initiatives since September 11
have not yielded a level of progress on chemi-
cal plant security commensurate with the
potential catastrophic consequences posed by
terrorist threats. This is especially remarkable
given the potential consequences of a terror-
ist attack, coupled with the devastating
lessons of Bhopal, September 11, and most
recently, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Overall, the levels of activity and achievement
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Figure 1. Perceived effectiveness of company actions in lessening vulnerability to and in preparing to
respond to a terrorist attack based on the percentage of respondents choosing each survey answer.
Bars represent the reported effectiveness of company actions in either lessening vulnerability of the
worksite or preparing the worksite to respond to a catastrophic event caused by a terrorist attack.
Answers were in response to survey question 6: Overall, since September 11, how effective have the
actions taken by the company been in lessening the vulnerability of your worksite to a catastrophic
event caused by [a terrorist attack]? (n = 124, 0.8% missing); and survey question 8: Overall, since
September 11, how effective have the actions taken by the company been in preparing your worksite for
a catastrophic event caused by [a terrorist attack]? (n = 125, 0.0% missing). Percentages may not add
up to 100% because of rounding. 
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reinforce recent congressional testimony that
voluntary measures alone are insufficient.
This is consistent with the contention of
Richard Falkenrath, former Deputy Assistant
to President George W. Bush and Homeland
Security Advisor, that 
It is a fallacy to think that proﬁt-maximizing corpo-
rations in a trade as inherently dangerous as the
manufacture and shipment of TIH [toxic inhala-
tion hazard] chemicals will ever voluntarily provide
the level of security that is appropriate given the
larger external risk to society as a whole. (Falkenrath
2005, p. 13)
The United States has already lost much
precious time in preparing for the possibility of
a catastrophic chemical release and urgently
needs laws and regulations capable of driving
dramatic improvements in chemical plant
security. If the nation is to reach its safety and
security goals of protecting communities and
workers, these legislative and regulatory initia-
tives will need to be enforceable and to provide
sufﬁcient guidance to ensure the application of
adequate resources. These initiatives will also
require both ongoing evaluation—guided by
tools such as the OECD’s activities and out-
come indicators (OECD 2003b)—and report-
ing of progress to both Congress and the
public. Fortunately, the environmental health
community’s broad range of expertise makes it
uniquely qualiﬁed to support these initiatives
by advocating for and developing policy, pro-
viding scientific consultation, evaluating
results, and informing and engaging key stake-
holders. Below we provide recommendations
for legislative and regulatory action to address
these issues.
Recommendation 1: Specify detailed
requirements for chemical site assessment and
security. Although survey respondents indi-
cated that most of the facilities had conducted
vulnerability assessment and security enhance-
ments since September 11, their responses also
suggest that many sites still have not taken
these initial steps. This is consistent with news
reports of the ease with which outsiders have
gained unfettered access to reportedly secured
chemical plants (CBS News 2003; Prine
2002, 2003).
Recommendation 2: Mandate audit inspec-
tions supported by significant penalties for
cases of noncompliance. Detailed requirements
(Recommendation 1) need to be coupled with
audit inspections by appropriate government
agencies and certain and swift enforcement
with severe penalties for noncompliance
(McQuiston et al. 1998). Rigorous, uniform
enforcement of mandatory requirements will
help ensure that unresponsive companies do
not gain competitive advantage over those that
comply.
Recommendation 3: Require progress
toward achieving inherently safer processes,
including the minimizing of storage of highly
hazardous chemicals. Improvements in
perimeter security can never ensure a site’s
safety from terrorist attacks and can divert
scarce resources away from overall plant safety.
The most effective ways to prevent RMP sites
from becoming weapons of mass destruction
are to eliminate or drastically reduce the sub-
stances that, if released into the environment,
could kill or harm thousands of workers and
community members.
The value and potential of chemical sub-
stitution, a primary means for creating inher-
ently safer processes, have been achieved in
many cases. For example, water treatment
plants have replaced chlorine gas with less
hazardous chemicals, and technologies exist to
replace large quantities of hydroﬂuoric acid at
oil refineries (Purvis and Herman 2005).
Offering further evidence of the viability of
inherently safer approaches, approximately
one in six sites in this study reported having
acted since September 11 to reduce their vol-
umes of hazardous substances. Industry must
be required to apply these approaches as
broadly as possible.
Recommendation 4: Examine and require
additional effective actions in prevention,
emergency preparedness, and response and
remediation. Certainly, in the short term, not
all companies will find and apply inherently
safer approaches universally. Therefore, addi-
tional requirements that help bridge this gap
will create safer chemical sites. For example,
provisions should ensure that reactive materi-
als are adequately isolated from each other;
that plant infrastructure is hardened against
attack; and that mitigation systems sufﬁcient
to suppress, neutralize, and contain hazards
are ready should vessels be breached.
Recommendation 5: Mandate and fund
the upgrading of emergency communication
systems. There may be limited if any advanced
warning of a chemical attack. Effective emer-
gency communication systems must be opera-
tive if facilities and communities are to respond
immediately and effectively. The government
must ensure that the private sector finally
upgrades interoperable emergency communi-
cation systems that were proven dysfunctional
on September 11 and again during Hurricane
Katrina. These requirements will help ensure
the viability of both the National Incident
Management System (DHS 2004a) and the
National Response Plan (DHS 2004b).
Recommendation 6: Involve workers and
community members in plan creation and
equip and prepare them to prevent and
respond effectively to an incident. Chemical
site employees, who will be at ground zero in
the event of a terrorist attack, are the primary
stakeholders in plant security issues. Further,
these employees’ collective expertise is vital to
improving safety and security for themselves
and their communities. Indeed, the American
Chemistry Council’s commitment to safety
and performance lists “operators,” who are
typically hourly employees, along with
chemists and engineers as “experts in the busi-
ness of managing and reducing risks associ-
ated with making chemicals” (American
Chemistry Council 2002, p. 6). Similarly, the
Occupational Safety and Health Process Safety
Management Standard requires employers to 
consult with employees and their representatives on
the conduct and development of process hazards
analyses and on the development of the other ele-
ments of process safety management. [Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 1992]
Also, community members, including
local government officials and emergency
responders, will be essential players in this
planning and implementation effort. Effective
involvement for all parties requires a monu-
mental training initiative targeting site work-
ers, emergency responders, remediation
workers, and communities. The National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
Worker Education and Training Program
(Research Triangle Park, NC) offers a highly
successful model program.
Fortunately, some of the policy instru-
ments needed to operationalize and enforce
these recommendations are already in place.
Congress needs only to mandate adaptations
of the existing OSHA standards and U.S. EPA
regulations to terrorist threats (OSHA 1992;
U.S. EPA 1996). The DHS, OSHA, and the
U.S. EPA should each enforce the parts of
legislation that focus on its area of expertise.
In conclusion, as policy makers grapple
with tangible ways to enhance U.S. security
against possible terrorist threats, these recom-
mendations represent a rare opportunity to
advance this mission at a pace appropriate for
looming dangers. Chemical site employees,
surrounding communities, and the nation
deserve no less.
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